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Abstract:  This paper extends behavioral economics’ realist methodological critique of rational 
choice theory to include the type of logical reasoning underlying its axiomatic foundations.  A 
purely realist critique ignores Kahneman’s emphasis on how the theory’s  axiomatic foundations 
make it  normative.  I extend his critique to the theory’s reliance on classical logic, which excludes 
the concept of possibility employed in counterfactual reasoning.  Nudge theory reflects this in 
employing counterfactual conditionals.  This answers the complaint that the Homo sapiens agent 
conception ultimately reduces to a Homo economicus conception, and also provides grounds for 
treating Homo sapiens as an adaptive, non-optimizing, reflexive agent. 
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Behavioral economics’ critique of neoclassical economics’ rational choice theory concerns not only 
the substantive issue of whether people behave rationally, but also important methodological 
issues.  Indeed, the criticism many behavioral economists make of rational choice theory is that it 
is unrealistic (e.g., Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Thaler 2016).  Behavioral economics’ success 
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on this view is a result of its being better supported by empirical evidence about choice behavior.  
At the same time, while the axiomatic foundations of rational choice theory are seen as a cause of 
its being unrealistic, this methodological critique per se leaves unexamined the nature of the 
deductive reasoning employed in rational choice theory as if its effects were methodologically 
neutral.   
This paper argues that its effects are not neutral, and that it is important to see how it creates a 
bias in favor of that theory and against behavioral economics.  To show this, I first argue that 
Daniel Kahneman’s methodological critique of rational choice theory as normative goes beyond 
the familiar argument that rational choice theory is insufficiently grounded in the evidence 
regarding choice, and depends on how the axiomatic character of that theory restricts the kinds 
of information we include in our theories of choice behavior.  I then use classical logic’s famous 
problem of deduction to identify what is problematic about traditional logical reasoning in 
explanations of choice behavior, and go on to show that a different type of logical reasoning 
associated with counterfactual conditionals, modal concepts, and natural language plays a role in 
behavioral economics.  The paper concludes that a behavioral economics’ methodological critique 
of neoclassical rational choice theory not only emphasizes realism and the importance of 
observation but also the type of logical reasoning we employ in developing theories of behavior, 
and argues that this is central to developing an alternative conception of economic agents as 
adaptive and reflexive rather than optimizing. 
 
Kahneman’s methodological critique   
In his Nobel lecture, Daniel Kahneman drew an important methodological distinction between 
prospect theory and rational choice theory as follows: 
One novelty of prospect theory was that it was explicitly presented as a formal descriptive 
theory of the choices that people actually make, not as a normative model. This was a 
departure from a long history of choice models that served double duty as normative logics 
and as idealized descriptive models (2003, p. 1456). 
For Kahneman, rational choice theory is “normative” in the sense that it axiomatically postulates 
a set of assumptions, especially in regard to the nature of preferences (completeness, transitivity, 
and independence of irrelevant alternatives), that have the effect of defining what rational 
behavior involves.  As a top-down methodological approach that gives priority to logical 
foundations, it does this by determining what sort of evidence counts in explanations of choice 
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behavior, and in this way produces “idealized descriptive models.”  In contrast, prospect theory 
advances what Kahneman calls a “formal descriptive theory” that instead begins in a bottom-up 
way with observational evidence regarding “the choices that people actually make” and then 
formalizes its theories on the basis of that empirical foundation.   
Kahneman’s critique of rational choice theory as employing a top-down methodology, then, is that 
it gets the fit between theory and evidence wrong because it places the weight on the former rather 
than the latter.  But why is this specifically normative?  Why not simply say that rational choice 
theory is too top-down and insufficiently empirical?  Consider, then, what the contrast between 
an axiomatic, top-down type of theory and a more empirical bottom-up type of theory involves in 
regard to the information that each allows. 
Axiomatic reasoning deduces a set of inferences from a set of axioms or assumptions, and if the 
reasoning involved is valid, then according to the rules of classical formal logic the information 
appearing in those inferences must already be contained in those axioms.  Indeed, one of the 
reasons that a valid deductive inference is a necessary inference is that what is inferred must 
follow fully from what is assumed and nothing else has been introduced in the inference.  A top-
down axiomatic theory is normative, then, in that it limits what information that theory admits to 
the information its axioms contain.  For example, in axiomatic choice theory preferences are 
assumed to be transitive, so any information from the world showing that preferences are 
intransitive must appear as an anomaly, and consequently can be disregarded as irrelevant to that 
theory.  
In contrast, a bottom-up methodology that places weight on evidence operates inductively in 
allowing any new information that observation might produce to be worked into theory – 
Kahneman’s idea of a “formal descriptive theory.”  Its information base is not limited by a pre-
given set of axioms or assumptions but is open to whatever observation of the world produces.  
The rules of inductive inference also play a regulatory role regarding what conclusions can be 
drawn from evidence, namely, there must be sufficient evidence of a relationship to claim it exists, 
but by comparison these rules are open in that new information can always be added to an 
inductive inference.   
A top-down axiomatic theory type of theory, consequently, has a ‘self-fulfilling’ character in that 
the evidence it allows must always confirm its assumptions.  This is important for understanding 
why a realist critique of rational choice theory is incomplete and potentially ineffective.  The claim 
that only behavioral economics is evidentially grounded is not persuasive to defenders of rational 
choice theory who reject evidence inconsistent with its axiomatic foundations, and point instead 
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to evidence supporting rational choice theory – their own “idealized descriptive” view of the 
evidence.   
Indeed, Kahneman’s view that people should behave rationally were they not subject to the 
behavioral biases we observe betrays an ambivalent understanding of the role of axiomatic 
reasoning plays in decision theory, and opens the door to the defenders of rational choice theory.  
I suggest, then, that the full force of the realist critique rests not only on the theory-evidence fit 
issue but also on the relationship between the nature of logical reasoning and allowable 
information.  Understanding this further requires we look more closely at the nature of deductive 
argument and the classical logic’s paradoxical problem of deduction.  
 
Classical logic’s problem of deduction  
Deductive reasoning in classical logic formally derives conclusions from premises by well-
established rules of valid inference, such as the modus ponens ‘if-then’ conditional (if p implies q 
and p is true, then q is true).  Deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are our two main forms 
of explanation, and since inductive reasoning, when it is justified, provide new information about 
the world, it seems that deductive reasoning as the companion to inductive reasoning should also 
provide new information about the world.  Yet that the conclusions to deductive arguments only 
contain information already present their premises is contrary to this.  Logically speaking, 
deductive arguments are tautological or circular, and the truths they contain are only truths by 
definition.  At the same time, many of the results of complicated deductive arguments, such as in 
mathematics, are non-trivial and accordingly appear to tell us something new, so we have a 
paradoxical situation.1 
The problem of deduction is a long-standing, much discussed problem in the history of 
philosophy, and here I only aim to identify one general response to it on the part of philosophers 
that I will argue below bears on the nature of the axiomatic reasoning in rational choice theory.  
That general response, then, is to argue that the problem of deduction derives from how classical 
logic limits our representation of how people actually reason deductively and the information they 
possess and rely on in doing so: specifically it excludes what are called modal concepts, especially 
the concept of possibility, that express ideas about what might or could be the case.  If p then q 
                                                             
1 “If in an inference the conclusion is not contained in the premises, it cannot be valid; and if the conclusion 
is not different from the premises, it is useless; but the conclusion cannot be contained in the premises and 
also possess novelty; hence inferences cannot be both valid and useful” (Cohen and Nagel, 1934/62/93), 
pp. 173-176). 
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guarantees the truth of q if p is true.  But we are often uncertain about what we think is true and 
reason in terms of contingencies. 
The standard argument, then, is that every deduction has behind it a set of possibilities that have 
been eliminated, and that, our knowing this, allows us to confidently say that the inference could 
not have been otherwise.  Yet these possibilities remain latent in that inference – latent because 
they have been eliminated – while as such the information they possess cannot be present in the 
inference itself.  The inference thus appears not to convey any new information, but in fact does 
in the form of the possibilities that are ruled out.   An example of this would be if you assume it is 
true that firms are perfectly efficient (agents behave in a specific manner), and infer by modus 
ponens what must then be true,  assuming away the possibility of x-inefficiency (a point made by 
Leibenstein). You thus have a biased and mis-specified but logically consistent model. 
What grounds might there be, then, for giving up traditional logical thinking and reasoning in 
terms of contingency?  One good reason is that this is the way that natural languages work, which 
rely heavily on modal concepts and use expressions such as ‘what might’ or ‘could be’ the case, as 
reflected in their distinction between indicative and subjunctive moods.2  Natural languages are 
thus rich in information.  Classical logic, such as the modus ponens principle, on the surface 
excludes possibilities eliminated as a direct element in producing a deduction.  Indeed, it might 
be said that its success in explaining valid inference trades off against and comes at the price of 
suppressing information that we use when we think in terms of possibilities.  This response to the 
classical logic’s problem of deduction, then, essentially argues that the information base people 
employ in deductive reasoning is implicitly broader than it appears, and more like what we 
observe in natural languages, so that deductions are actually information producing.3  
An important implication of this (which bears on the idea of nudges) is that, in addition to the 
standard view of conditional statements associated with the modus ponens principle, there exists 
a whole set of counterfactual conditionals about which we commonly reason.  The standard modus 
ponens inference involves an ‘if-then’ reasoning where the ‘if’ part (or p) refers to a statement that 
is true in order for that conditional inference to be true.  In the case of counterfactual conditionals, 
however, we often infer a true ‘then’ statement when the ‘if’ in question is a possibility that could 
                                                             
2 The indicative mood is used to say what is/was/will be the case whereas the subjunctive mood is used to 
say what could, would, should, may, might, etc. be the case. 
3 For example, the philosopher Hintikka argued that we might solve the problem of deduction if we 
distinguish between ‘surface’ information and ‘depth’ information since this would allow us to refer to 
information in a set of premises not explicitly appearing in them as part of the inference involved.  Then 
valid inference would convey new information relative to that ‘depth’ information (Hintikka, 1973).   
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have been true but is not true as a matter of fact.  For example, many people would say that the 
statement ‘If Clinton had won the state of Wisconsin in the 2016 U.S. presidential, she would have 
won that election’ is a true statement.  The ‘if’ part of this inference is contrary to fact, since Clinton 
did not win the state of Wisconsin, but it was nonetheless possible that Clinton might have won 
Wisconsin.  The truth of the inference, then, depends on our understanding that possibility.  The 
type of non-standard logical reasoning used to evaluate counterfactual conditionals of this kind is 
broadly called modal logic, and expressions such as ‘it is possible that’ which it investigates are 
referred to as modal operators.4   
However, my goal here is not to review modern developments in the philosophy of logic, but rather 
to simply show in the next section that behavioral economics’ nudge thinking shares the ideas 
motivating these developments, and that this provides a further foundation to its methodological 
critique of rational choice theory. 
 
Behavioral economics’ analysis of nudges 
In Nudge (2008), the justification for choice architects intervening in people’s choices is that this 
would “make choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 5; their 
emphasis).  The emphasis on what choosers themselves judge would make them better off 
provides a response to the criticism that such interventions are paternalist and limit individuals’ 
freedom.  If nudges produce outcomes that people would want were they informed about their 
consequences, then they constitute outcomes they would freely choose in such circumstances.   
Key to this argument, then, is the language of ‘would’ and ‘were.’  In effect, the other side of a 
world of bounded rationality are the nudges designed to achieve unrealized possibilities by 
expanding the information individuals have about their choices.  Nudges, accordingly, can be 
formulated in terms of counterfactual conditionals – ‘if-then’ relationships with matters contrary 
to fact that are nonetheless possible.  For example, when individuals fail to invest in retirement 
plans they would prefer had they better information, investing in those preferred investments is 
both contrary to the facts and was yet still possible.  Like in the Clinton example above, we would 
say that the (true) counterfactual conditional in this case is: ‘if they had possessed better 
information regarding their retirement options and invested in retirement plans they preferred, 
they would have been better off.’  Being more knowledgeable about their retirement options, then, 
                                                             
4 Modal logic is a logic of modal operators such as ‘it is possible that’ or ‘it is necessary that’  influentially 
developed by the philosopher Saul Kripke (Kripke, 1980).   
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is a matter of their reasoning in terms of the space of possibilities they face.  This indeed involves 
a different emphasis than much of the nudge literature, which is formulated in such a way as to 
work ‘behind the backs’ of those affected by nudges.     
On this reading, behavioral economics’ methodological critique of rational choice theory is not 
just that it is unrealistic because its predictions are not well supported by observations of choice 
behavior.  It is also unrealistic because its axiomatic logical foundations prevent it from explaining 
the richer informational base choice behavior involves.  This limitation walls off observational 
evidence contrary to its rational choice predictions, and thereby advances an explanation of choice 
behavior that fails to capture a fundamental part of how people reason about their choices.  As 
natural languages show, people commonly reason counterfactually in terms of what could have 
happened but often did not in order to understand the possibilities they face in making choices.  
In contrast, the axiomatic foundations of rational choice theory require that choice be modeled as 
determinate and closed to the realm of possibility – thus justifying its optimization interpretation 
of behavior.    
Broadening the logical and information basis of choice theory has another consequence.  On many 
interpretations of behavioral economics, it is argued that Homo sapiens agents ultimately reduce 
to Homo economicus agents because, should nudges eliminate bounded rationality, then Homo 
sapiens agents would be indistinguishable from a Homo economicus agents.  In effect, ‘a Homo 
economicus wolf lurks in every Homo sapiens sheep’s clothing.’  Yet on the argument here this 
identification fails, since the characteristics of the Homo economicus depend solely on 
assumptions about preferences attributed to individuals, whereas the characteristics of a Homo 
sapiens depend upon individuals’ grasp of the complex possibilities operating in the world they 
occupy, where this includes the nature of social relationships and all the possible ways that they 
can change and evolve.  Indeed, social context matters to people’s choices, but social context is 
also fluid and in need of constant interpretation.   
In the original emphasis on nudges as effectively occurring behind the backs of agents (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008), with the rational Homo economicus lurking in the wings, it is easy to retreat to 
the familiar world of classical logic with its highly determinate (optimal) outcomes.  Cass 
Sunstein’s subsequent Choosing Not to Choose book (2015) takes a different view.   Moving away 
from nudges, he argues that people intentionally pass responsibility for many of their choices to 
a multitude of others (doctors, accountants, stores, schools, etc.) by adopting default rules 
regarding certain types of choices they wish to delegate to others (‘in such-and-such 
circumstances, I will rely on the expertise of Y’).  Implicitly, that is, Sunstein assumes that people 
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recognize the complex nature of the world they face, conclude they cannot anticipate all 
possibilities, and feely elect others expert in the possibilities they may encounter as their 
representatives.  This more social vision of behavior contrasts sharply with the original nudge 
conception rooted ultimately in the atomistic Homo economicus.5  
 
Reflexive non-optimizing economic agents Here	 I	offer	brief	 final	comments	regarding	what	 the	discussion	here	 contributes	 to	our	 thinking	about	 the	nature	of	 economic	 agents.	 	As	 a	point	of	 entry,	 recall	 that	Herbert	 Simon	argued	that	
“Human rational behavior … is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task 
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon 1990, p. 7).  This suggests 
that adaptation rather than optimization best characterizes people’s choice behavior.  Yet rational 
choice theorists can still reply that whatever environment they find themselves in, agents must 
still optimize, so it is not immediately clear why we should think adaptation should characterize 
choice behavior rather than optimization.   
I have argued, then, that optimization behavior is a product of neoclassicism’s axiomatic analysis 
of choice that makes possibility irrelevant to behavior.  This means that the environment agents 
find themselves in must also always be determinate, which would indeed make it possible for 
agents to optimize.  However, if we reason instead in natural language terms about choice 
behavior, then the environment that agents find themselves in should be seen as exhibiting a 
spectrum of determinable and indeterminable possibilities, rather than always determinate (if 
stochastic) states of affairs.  In effect, there are no unique deterministic equilibrium states in a 
world that is open to a range of possibility.  This then means that agents’ choices need to be seen 
as adjustable or revisable, allowing them to continually adapt to how the circumstances of choice 
evolve.  Thus, just as classical deductive reasoning obscures how human thinking operates in 
terms of possibilities, so rational choice theory’s optimization focus obscures how agents reason 
in terms of a range of possible interactions between “the structure of task environments and the 
computational capabilities of the actor.”     
I characterize such agents as reflexive to capture how their choices have feedback mechanisms 
built into them.  Every choice is framed by the range of possibilities agents can imagine, and as 
                                                             
5 An important implication of this is that, contrary to J.S. Mill’s famous On Liberty view (1859) that 
individual freedom stems from individual action alone, in a world in which people delegate responsibility 
for many of their choices to others, their freedom is increased beyond the reach of their own choices (Davis, 
2018). 
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such come with a range of adjustment strategies that feed back into their subsequent choices.  
Choice is then explained in process terms with interacting forward and backward linkages.  In 
contrast, optimization analysis, as framed by classical logic, essentially occurs outside of time, and 
thus substitutes an equilibrium account of many agents’ optimizing choices for an in-time 
dynamics of interaction of many adaptive reflexive agents.   
This latter subject is what behavioral economic theory should investigate.  It moves away from the 
neoclassical equilibrium set-up to describe how agents evolve and interact in changeable social 
settings.  This involves a bottom-up methodological approach that not only gives greater space to 
empirical research but also employs a richer logical thinking reflecting agents’ counterfactual 
reasoning.  Kahneman’s critique of rational choice theory only goes part way in this regard, and 
its failure to examine the nature and implications of standard logical reasoning that theory 
employs runs the risk of leaving that theory in place.  This paper has attempted to rebuild that 
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